Using a probabilistic safety assessment, a risk evaluation framework for an aircraft crash into an interim spent fuel storage facility is presented. Damage evaluation of a detailed generic cask model in a simplified building structure under an aircraft impact is discussed through a numerical structural analysis and an analytical fragility assessment. Sequences of the impact scenario are shown in a developed event tree, with uncertainties considered in the impact analysis and failure probabilities calculated. To evaluate the influence of parameters relevant to design safety, risks are estimated for three specification levels of cask and storage facility structures. The proposed assessment procedure includes the determination of the loading parameters, reference impact scenario, structural response analyses of facility walls, cask containment, and fuel assemblies, and a radiological consequence analysis with doseerisk estimation. The risk results for the proposed scenario in this study are expected to be small relative to those of design basis accidents for best-estimated conservative values. The importance of this framework is seen in its flexibility to evaluate the capability of the facility to withstand an aircraft impact and in its ability to anticipate potential realistic risks; the framework also provides insight into epistemic uncertainty in the available data and into the sensitivity of the design parameters for future research.
1.

Introduction
An intentional aircraft impact (AI) into hazardous facilities became a prominent issue after September 11, 2001 . The questions then arose as to what extent an interim storage facility (ISF) can adequately protect against a large commercial AI and what momentous consequences an AI may pose to society and the environment. To answer these questions, possible damage scenarios with various AI loading conditions should be investigated to estimate the potential risks. Several safety assessment studies have considered various mechanical and thermal loadings that represent severe impact conditions in the frame of a probabilistic safety assessment with conservative assumptions, or just to evaluate the structural integrity of a cask assembly based on a deterministic approach [1e10] . However, no risk assessment with a scenario of a realistic aircraft crash into an ISF has yet been completed. Development of a comprehensive and systematic framework that comprises several elements of risk evaluation would make it possible to determine the feasibility of using such a framework to predict the expected hazard posed to the public, in addition to enhancing the reliability of facility/cask designs under possible severe impact loadings from aircraft crash. Further, this approach will enable the development of a socalled risk-informed regulatory framework, which is more reasonable than conventional approaches that rely more on conservatism. Thus, under the frame of a probabilistic approach, this study attempts to integrate more elements into the development of a realistic aircraft crash scenario, including possible damage consequences and associated release of fission products to the environment.
The current study covers only the first assessment stage of the accident scenario, which is a direct mechanical impact from an intended AI. The second assessment stage in follow-up research will examine associated radiological releases from subsequent fire and multicask collisions that will supplement the radiological consequences of the first stage. The current analysis is divided into four major parts: Fig. 1 e Illustration of impact scenario with aircraft crash event tree model.
Part 1 sets up the reference impact scenario; Part 2 provides a structural response analysis; Part 3 outlines the radiological consequence analysis; and Part 4 summarizes the event tree analysis results and the accident doseerisk estimations. Illustrative examples are presented in this paper for high-, median-, and low-resistance structures subjected to concentrated impact loadings from aircraft crash. As this paper only touches on the methods used in each analysis stage with brief discussions and summarized results, readers are referred to the list of references for further details on the methods, assumptions, and information used in this study.
Methodology overview and reference modal study
It is commonly known that ISFs are ruggedly built and storage casks are conservatively designed to comply with stringent regulatory requirements; only the local response [11] , which Fig. 2 e Overview of the analysis approach for aircraft impact into an interim storage facility. RC, reinforced concrete.
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refers to penetration and perforation of the building structure caused by a stiff element impact, is considered in this study. The reference case study is a regional load from an independent jet engine impact that perforates the reinforced concrete (RC) wall and directly hits a freestanding, single, fully loaded metal cask being the worst-case scenario. Fig. 1 illustrates the impact scenario and sequence of events. Readers are referred to the authors' previous work [12] for further details on the justification and development of the aircraft crash scenario. Table 1 provides the model specifications that are employed in the analysis. Specifications of concrete strength class, wall thickness, elastic recovery of seal, and U-235 burnup rate are separated into three sets and analyzed accordingly. These parameters are regarded as safety relevant components, categorized in respect to increasing or decreasing potential risk. The RC class range is from C16 as a low-resistance level (L) to C25 as a high-resistance level (H), which is commonly used in ISF design [1, 2] . Thicknesses of existing ISFs' walls vary from 70 cm to 120 cm [13] ; therefore, 70 cm is considered as a low-resistance structure (L), 95 cm as a median-resistance structure (M), and 120 cm as a highresistance structure (H). Regarding the cask's metal seal, it may lose seating pressure and sealing forces due to relaxation effects and creeping; these degradation mechanisms could cause a decrease in the elastic recovery of the seal during long-term operation, as investigated by Wolff et al. [14] . The minimum reduction of the elastic recovery distance as a function of holding time and temperature is around 0.03 mm, while the elastic recovery distance of a new seal is around 0.25 mm [14] . Thus, this study defines the elastic recovery distances for the low-(L), median-(M), and high-performance (H) seals as 0.03 mm, 0.15 mm, and 0.25 mm, respectively. Three burnup rates are also considered in the consequences analysis, as follows: a low burnup rate at 25 GWd/MTU, an intermediate burnup rate at 45 GWd/MTU, and a high burnup rate at 60 GWd/MTU. The rupture strain of rod failure is found to decrease when the burnup rate increases, due to the effect of the fuel burnup on the cladding embrittlement (see Section 3 for further explanations); therefore, the low burnup rate is considered to indicate a high-resistance structure (H), and the 
high burnup rate a low-resistance structure (L). The general approach of this study is outlined schematically in Fig. 2 , which addresses the structural response and radiological consequence analyses with inputs and outputs. The results of this study are intended to act as a basis of discussion and to provide comparisons between the three sets of specification levels.
Structural response analyses
The structural response analysis of this study is divided into three parts. The first part is a fragility analysis of the facility wall based on an empirical model, followed by a structural response analysis of the cask lid closure, with the last part investigating the fuel rod failure under a mechanical impact load. Detailed methodologies and information related to the fragility analysis of the facility wall and the lid gap analysis are not covered in this paper, as details of these analyses can be found in the authors' previous work [12, 15] .
Facility RC wall damage analysis
As a best deterministic estimation, with a bias toward conservatism, as suggested in the NEI (Nuclear Energy Institute, U.S.) report [16] , the empirical formulas employed in this study can predict the minimum RC wall thickness required to prevent local damage caused by the normal impact of an N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 4 1 1 e4 2 5 aircraft engine and its residual velocity. Impact speeds and compressive strengths of concrete are treated probabilistically as major sources of uncertainty. Fig. 3 displays a frequency histogram of AI speeds and the limited set of data that has been collected from the literature [17, 18] . The mathematical model of the probability density function, as proposed by € Oztemel and S ‚ ensoy [19] using the lognormal distribution model, is applied to represent the uncertainty in the compressive strength of concrete for the three classes (C16, C20, and C25) shown in Fig. 4 . The obtained distribution curves for residual velocity variables are presented in Fig. 5 for the three structural levels of the RC wall. Utilizing the Monte-Carlo method, the cumulative distribution function for perforation thickness F(t w ) is generated based on 10,000 trials, as shown in Fig. 6 . The failure probability of a given wall thickness (P w ) is calculated from the complementary cumulative distribution function. Therefore, the estimated failure probabilities for the three grades of wall are as follows: P w(LG) ¼ 0.98, P w(MG) ¼ 0.8, and P w(HG) ¼ 0.27. It is noticeable that the failure probabilities of the facility wall for low-to median-resistance structures are expected to be very high compared with those for high-resistance structures. Therefore, selection of high-level design properties for a robust wall, namely, thickness and concrete strength, is recommended to enhance ISF capacity to withstand any stiff element impact from an aircraft crash.
Metal cask damage analysis
For the engineecask impact analysis, the impact loadetime history function and effective loading contact area for the relevant aircraft engine are needed. This paper does not discuss the derivation of the loadetime function since the N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 4 1 1 e4 2 5
analytical approach and the assumptions in the derivation of the jet engine impact load were discussed in detail previously [12, 15] . [15] is shown in Fig. 7 ; this model consists of a carbon steel cask body with one bolted upper lid closure without impact limiters, and a solid inner dummy weight representing the interior structure and spent fuel assemblies. The purpose of this model was to analyze the dynamic response of the lid closure system in order to calculate the leakage path area between the lid and the flange, since the lid seal plays an essential role in preventing the escape of fine particulates and radioactive gases from the cask. Therefore, unnecessary details of the cask system, such as the interior structures, were not modeled. The explicit time integration solver LS-DYNA [20] was used to address the impact problem effectively. In the lid gap analysis, it is assumed that a closure opening greater than the precompression state of the metallic seal will cause leakage. Three elastic recovery distances are examined in the analysis representing the performance of the metallic seal, as mentioned in Table 1 . The cask failure criteria, defined by Almomani et al. [12, 15] , are as follows: recoverable damage is defined as the damage that occurs when the opening gaps are less than the elastic recovery distance (<e r ); seal damage is defined as the damage that occurs when the opening gaps exceed the elastic recovery distance (>e r ); and containment damage is defined as the damage that occurs when an irreversible deformation occurs on the cask containment. Fig. 8 summarizes the leak areas estimated in this study, and Table 2 shows the response status of the cask for each Table 3 e Conditional probability calculations for the cask response statuses. Fig. 9 e Cask finite element models for fuel assembly response evaluation.
impact condition. Further explanation of the estimation method for leakage path areas and the cask structure response results have been presented in the authors' previous work [15] .
From the results of numerical simulations, probabilities of cask response (P c ) in each impact case were estimated by integrating the area under the residual velocity distribution curves WðV R Þ, shown in Fig. 5 , with the defined boundary criteria (V a , and V b ) shown in Table 3 .
3.3.
Fuel cladding damage analysis
The dynamic impact characteristics of a fuel assembly inside the cask are analyzed using the explicit nonlinear FE code ABAQUS [21] . Any method to evaluate fuel assembly response under mechanical impact load requires a detailed FE model. A generic cask model, consisting of a carbon steel cask body and a detailed interior structure without the bolted upper lid closure system, is constructed (Fig. 9) . The interior structure includes a fuel basket, fuel basket supports, and one fuel assembly placed at the location of engine impact. The other basket cells, which include 20 fuel assemblies, are filled with solid dummy bodies to correct the package weight. The purpose of this model is to analyze the dynamic response of the fuel assembly and estimate the fraction of rods that fail during the impact as an essential parameter of the radiological consequences. All the materials are modeled as isotropic Fig. 10 e Five orientations of jet engine impact load on the storage cask.
elasticeplastic with hardening; material properties are listed in Table 4 . In addition, element characteristics are listed in Table 5 . Simplified spacer grids were modeled as a box structure with springs and dimples that are connected to the fuel rods. The guide tube is connected to the spacer grids by a tie constraint. The linear spring stiffness value is 99.1 kN/m and the dimple value is 494.45 kN/m. In addition, mesh refinement studies for the areas of interest in both models have been carried out to obtain a steady discretization error. To achieve stable time integration, mesh distortion, severely distorted element deletion, reduced integration, and hourglass control are all activated in the analysis. As the cask is freestanding on a concrete pad, automatic surface-to-surface contact was implemented between the interfaces of all components. The friction coefficient is reasonably assumed to be 0.2 at the contact surfaces.
The impact analysis studied five impact orientations: lateral impacts on the lower (Case 1), center (Case 2), and upper parts of the cask (Case 3); an impact on an upper corner (Case 4); and a vertical impact on the lid closure (Case 5). The impact loading as a function of time is tabulated, evenly distributed, and perpendicularly directed to the nodes at the impact area. Fig. 10 illustrates the impact load locations applied to the cask body model.
Since it is difficult to justify the impact orientations, it is assumed that the impact angle is equally distributed between 0 and 90 on the cask body; this is done in order to provide a comprehensive and systematic evaluation of all the impact cases without the need for an exact clue of the possibility of occurrence. The jet engine of a B747 was chosen for this study to provide an upper bound impact load on the cask body. Whereas the scenario itself is a general impact scenario that can represent both commercial airplanes and military or hobby aircrafts. The maximum possible impact angle of a large commercial aircraft is known to be less than 15 [18] .
Thus, the range from 0 to 15 is considered as the probable angle of lateral impact, while the range of 15e75 represents possible impact angles that depend on uncertain sequences of the scenario, with the range of 75e90 representing possible impact angles from military or hobby aircrafts. Furthermore, Fig. 11 e Illustration of the estimation method of fuel damage ratio for one fuel bundle. 
vulnerable impact areas on the cask body are divided into three areas: lateral (60%), corner (20%), and vertical (20%). Therefore, the impact orientation probabilities (P o ) of lateral, corner, and vertical impacts for the five defined impact areas on the cask body are as follows: N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 4 1 1 e4 2 5
For the fuel assembly response analysis, the cladding strain ratios have been calculated numerically. The strain failure criteria that would induce a cladding rupture with respect to burnup rate level are taken from SNL (Sandia National Laboratory) reports [22, 23] , as follows:
High burnup (55e60 GWd/ MTU): strain failure criterion (1%) Intermediate burnup (40e45 GWd/ MTU): strain failure criterion (4%) Low burnup (20e25 GWd/ MTU): strain failure criterion (8%)
From the above criteria, it is assumed that when the scaled strain level is equal to or greater than the strain failure criterion, the fuel rod will fail. Furthermore, this is a conservative approach; it is assumed that 1% of the fuel rods will fail and leak at any impact load that causes strains less than the strain failure limits. Thus, the failure probability of the fuel assembly is deemed to be 1. However, fuel damage ratios (FDRs) for the impact conditions that induce strains exceeding the criteria were calculated using the practical FE modeling technique and used in the source term calculations. The steps of FDR estimation for one fuel bundle are illustrated in Fig. 11 , and the assumptions in the determination of the FDRs are listed as follows, with some conservatism: ▪ To investigate the maximum possible deformations, the reference fuel assembly is located close to the impacted load area. ▪ Calculated FDR and the deformed shape of the reference single fuel assembly are assumed to be the same for all other fuel assemblies. ▪ Pelletecladding interaction is not modeled, and all the masses of the pellets are lumped in the cladding without increasing rod stiffness.
The calculated FDRs for the 35 impact conditions are summarized in Table 6 ; Fig. 12 illustrates the maximum inplane principal strain results, as commonly used in fuel response to loads [1] , for the five cases at the maximum impact velocity (160 m/s).
Radiological consequence analysis
The release fraction coefficient is used to estimate the amount of radioactive materials suspended in the air due to physical stress from an accident; this parameter is an essential input for radiological consequence analyses [11] . A source term is used to describe the accidental airborne release of radioactive materials in atmospheric dispersion modeling. Descriptions of the estimation process for associated radioactive material releases from the release fraction coefficients and the source term of radioactive inventory are described in the authors' previous work [12] . Three inventories for the radionuclides involved in the scenario that dominate the inhalation dose for all the chemical elements classes (volatiles, fission gases, and solid particles) are calculated using the ORIGEN-ARP of SCALE v.6.1.3 code [24] and presented in Fig. 13 . Calculations for the element Co-60, called Chalk River Unidentified Deposits (CRUD), are conducted separately because this element would form by spallation of the chemical deposits on the surface of fuel rod cladding during reactor operation. The activity density of CRUD is around 140 mCi/cm 2 on the rods from pressurized water reactors, with the total surface area of the rods being around 1,200 cm 2 [22] . Thus, the Co-60 inventory per rod is 2 Â 10 5 mCi/rod, which is added to the radionuclide inventory for the fuel assembly CE 16 Â 16 as 51.2 Ci. The release fraction of CRUD from the cask to the environment is assumed to be 0.001, taken from the data of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission [25] and the work of Einziger and Beyer [26] . Table 7 displays the obtained release fractions multiplied by FDR for each event tree sequence condition and burnup rate. Fig. 13 e Radionuclide inventory of one fuel assembly for the three burnup rates.
The computer code HOTSPOT v.3.0.2 [27] , which was developed based on the Gaussian dispersion plume model, is used in this study to estimate the radionuclide spread from the accident. The reference person is presumed to have a breathing height of 1.5 m and a breathing rate of 3.47Ee4 m 3 /s. The wind speed reference height is 80 m and the release height is ground level. Hourly information from 1-year meteorological data, including wind speeds and directions, was utilized for a hypothetical site to determine the wind speed frequency groups in the scenario. In this study, three boundaries of interest surrounding the accident location are considered: an exclusion area boundary at 560 m, a lowpopulation zone at 5.7 km, and a population center distance at 7.6 km. The total effective dose equivalent at the three boundaries of interest is calculated by HOTSPOT for each event tree sequence, as shown in Table 8 .
Risk analysis framework
The doseerisk elements are the product of the probabilities of the impact condition and the corresponding responses (P w , P o , and P c ), and the fractions that lead to the release of radioactive materials that cause radiological consequences of magnitude (C), as illustrated in Fig. 14 . The measure of risk is given by Eq.
(1), which is applied in sequence line i:
In Fig. 14 , the initiating frequency of the aircraft crash accident (Column 1) is assumed to be 1, representing an intentional aircraft crash. As the storage wall building is the first barrier to protect the internal spent fuel storage casks from the AI, the results of the probability of perforation (P w ) for facility walls (low, median, and high) are inserted accordingly into Column 2. Then, the probability of each impact orientation is added in Column 3, as discussed in Section 3. Finally, the probability results of the cask response status, as defined in Table 3 , for the three structural performance levels of metallic seal, are inserted into Column 4. All probability data are multiplied, as shown in the Probability column. The maximum possible radiological consequences for each sequence line, as shown in Table 8 , are inserted into the Consequence column for the three rates of fuel burnup. Finally, through Eq. (1), the expected hazard to the public can be estimated in units of mSv/accident. Risk calculations for the three structural-resistance levels of facility/cask are summarized in the event tree for the three site boundaries of interest, as can be seen in Fig. 15 . Here, it should be noticed that the most severe damage consequence for the highresistance structures is from Sequence Number 8, while for the median-and low-resistance structures it is from Sequence Number 10. Investigations reveal that an impact of a heavy foreign component on the upper part or upper corner of the cask would be the most serious one among the impact conditions. Further studies to enhance the design of the upper part of the cask by adding additional mitigation systems are recommended.
Overall, the risks from the potential individual peak doses on the population due to these accident conditions expected for a single cask are far below the regulatory limits at any Table 7 e Calculated release fractions for each sequence and burnup rate. N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 4 1 1 e4 2 5 distance above the low-population zone (as the dose limit for the general public is 1 mSv/y); further, the current case scenario represents a very low risk of incurring latent cancer fatality. This study indicates the applicability of the methodology to ultimately reveal the risk from an aircraft crash through a realistic scenario, with some conservatism. Notably, the real risk of nuclear facility accidents includes the potential risk of land contamination and associated societal impacts, rather than the human health risk of radiation exposure only. Therefore, the model developed in this study can be used to assess these types of consequences once a specific site is determined. Moreover, new safety-related barriers or mitigation systems could be accommodated easily by the proposed framework. Thus, this study is expected to provide useful information for regulators and licensees concerning the most severe impact conditions. The results of this study demonstrate that a proper design of ISF physical protection systems, namely, concrete strength and thickness of the facility wall, as well as the seal and fuel cladding material in the storage cask, would enhance the reliability of storage facility/cask for a safe enclosure of radioactive waste materials and, consequently, may greatly reduce the risk of human-induced external events.
Seq. # Case # Status
F rel,k ¼ [RF C-E Â RF] Â RF R-C Â FDR
Concluding remarks
The aim of the present article has been to confirm the flexibility of the proposed framework, which was developed in the authors' previous research via an examination of three combinations of design structures of facility and cask for a hypothetical reference facility that presents integrated damage sequences from an aircraft crash scenario. In addition, a bestestimate structural analysis, including fuel assembly damage, has been incorporated using practical FE modeling techniques to simulate accurately and efficiently the structural response under energetic loading. Subsequently, the radiological consequences for a hypothetical site were calculated, and individual risks for each possible sequence were obtained through a quantitative event tree analysis. From the probability analysis, which takes into account parameter uncertainties with assumptions for three different facility capacities, the conclusion is that an AI on a single fully loaded storage cask is not expected to cause a radiological impact that exceeds regulatory limits under the worst-case scenario for the three sets of design structures studied here. To achieve the final goal of complete risk assessment, as detailed in the Introduction, a fire scenario and a secondary mechanical impact scenario on EAB, exclusion area boundary; LPZ, low-population zone; PCD, population center distance.
Fig. 14 e Event tree progression of aircraft crash [12] .
Fig . 15 e Aircraft event tree progression of probability, consequence, and risk estimation (mSv/accident) results for one cask. EAB, exclusion area boundary; LPZ, low-population zone; PCD, population center distance.
N u c l e a r E n g i n e e r i n g a n d T e c h n o l o g y 4 9 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 4 1 1 e4 2 5 multiple casks can be added to the proposed framework in order to evaluate accurately the overall associated radiological consequences to the public and the environment following an aircraft crash. The recommendations of this study give insight regarding the epistemic uncertainty in the available data for impact conditions and the sensitivity of the design parameters, which should be handled in a more practical manner in future research. Additional consideration of the material degradation properties of the spent fuel during the storage period should be given to control and regulate the transportation process and storage condition criteria, as well as to identify potential operating risks for enhancing safety operating procedures within different hypothetical accident conditions.
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